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THIN KI N G THE RIGHT STU FF: 
TYPES OF ACADEMIC R E ALITY IN 
ART ED U CATION 
Kar en A. Hamblen 
The purpose of t his pap~r Is to examine types of a(ademic reality in 
~raduatQ e~u(.tlon and how the accepted ones come to be considered as exclu-
sionary and correct ways to understand the field of art education. It is 
proposed tha t sociali zation processes in graduate programs offer attract ive 
r~wa rds to those who become proficient In the manipulation of s elected types of 
knowledge construction and modes of inquiry. The fol l owing aspects are di s -
cussed in terms of how they contribut e toward the shap ing of aca~~mlc con-
sciousness: (1) socialization procedures of graduate art education, (2) the 
failure of even refl exive modes of inqu iry to make graduate experiences re l a-
tive, and (3) assumptions shared by art educ~tors an~ other New Class intellec-
tuals (Goul der, 1979) . The socialization procedures of graduate art educat ion 
are discussed wi thin the framework of a social theory of knowledge distr ibu-
tion. 
TYPES OF ACA D E MI C 
REALITY IN 
ART EDUCAT I O N 
When I was a graduate student, I 
had several opportunities to observe 
candida~es who came to our campus to 
inter View for job openings in ar~ 
edUcation. Dart of the interview 
process consisted of the ca~dldate 
presenting some of his/her research, 
pr~ferably with a slide prosent~tion 
that kept it somewhat entertaining 
f or us . This event was open to 
anyone who wish~d to attend; the 
audience primarily consisted of 
facu l ty and graduate students. After 
the cand i date's forma 1 presentation, 
slhe wo uld anSwer questions . What 
predictably and qu ickly emerged from 
this interChange was that there 
~eemed to be sOm~ se rious wrong 
thinking go i ng On at other universi-
ties. Fresh from our class~s in 
which the latest theories , resea rch, 
and art educat ion developments had 
been discussed, we as ked the candi-
dates quest ions on ~articular sourc-
es, scholars, and i<::eas. To Our 
satisfying surprise , cand i dates were 
often unawa re of certa i n sources, or, 
aven i f they had read a particular 
book or article, they often gave 
Inte rpretations tha t were blatantly 
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wrong. Furtive glances, 8 stiffening 
dnd shifting of posture , anc. even 
perhaps a trace of horrified smugn~ss 
wou l d pass among us . The graduat<! 
students who asked Intr i cat e ques -
tions that ~robed the premises of a 
resident professor's favor ed i deas 
could be assured of looking goo~, 
even i f the (and; date managed to 
answer correctly. Thi s was Our home 
turf and treacherous terrain fo r t he 
candidate, and i t was as easy f or us 
to make po ints in thi s env i ronment as 
for th~ candidate to lose tnem. 
As far as I know, there never 
was any formal l~ed plan of conspiracy 
to put any candidate in a bad light, 
but candidates managed, in some 
measure, to commi t intel l ectual faux 
pas. 8esldes serving to el imina te 
candidates obviously incompatib l e 
wi th the genera I ph i losophy of 
current faculty member s, for graduate 
students, this informa l and unpl anned 
ri t e of occuoational passage seemed 
to verify t hat we were being educated 
In the right direction and outs iders 
were often woefully off-traCk. True 
bel ievers In the f ie ld of art educa-
ti on could be identif ied on the bas is 
of what they knew and how ~hey 
expressed themselve s. To e l aborate 
upon Tom Wo l fe's (1984) descriptive 
title, having the right stuff for the 
job was a matter of thinking the 
ri ght stuff. 
The purpcse of this paper is to 
examine types of academic reality and 
how some come to be vi ewed as correct 
and others as wrong in an environment 
ostensibly dedicated to the promulga-
tion of multiple vi ewpoints and to 
the examination of ideas . The 
discussion will be limited to gradu-
ate art education programs and how 
the particular characteristics of 
individual universities inculcate 
selected knowledge, assumptions, and 
procedures that lose their human 
authorship and become taken-for-gran-
ted. Integral to most socialization 
processes is the development of a 
resistance to looking at one's 
learned assumptions and procedures as 
being relative and humanly selected 
(Apple, 1979; Bowers, 1984). The 
concern in this paper is with how 
graduate program socialization may 
serve, despite i ts ostensible liber-
alizing cast , to limit the abilities 
of students to see their experiences 
as being relative in t ime and space . 
The fo l l owing aspects will be dis-
cussed in terms of how they contrib-
ute toward the shaping of academic 
consciousness: (1) socialization 
procedures of graduate art education, 
(2) the failure and limitations of 
even reflexive modes of inquiry to 
make graduate experiences re l ative, 
and (3) assumptions shared by art 
educators and other New Class intel -
lectuals (Gouldner, 1979). 
Most of us who observed the 
candidates' intervi ew sessions have 
subsequently, I am sure , learned all 
too well during our own job inter -
views at other uniVersities that 
right th i nking has little to do with 
a higher order of truth and a great 
deal to do with the university 
environment one happens to be in at 
the time. Yet, the patterns of 
thought and the procedures of inves-
tigation acquired during graduate 
study persist and remain a powerful 
i nfluence on one's academic reality 
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set, as basic similarities among the 
mature work of graduates from the 
same university of ten reveal. I am 
proposing that socialization pro-
cesses in graduate programs offer 
attractive rewards to those who 
become proficient in the manipulation 
of selected types of knowl edge 
construction and modes of investiga -
tion. Conversely, undesirab le 
consequences have been known to 
befall those who fail to internal ize 
the ir program 1s condoned assumptions 
and procedures of study. 





In this paper, the socialization 
procedures of graduate education are 
discussed within the framework of a 
social theory of knowledge distribu-
tion. According to Gouldner (1979), 
in the nineteenth century the control 
of production and capital drastically 
changed from the Old Class who 
possessed durable goods to the New 
Class who possessed knowledge and 
in f ormat ion which were va l idated by 
acquiring academ ic credentials. This 
New Class consists of intellectuals 
and technocrats who possess concepts 
and skills that enable them to 
manipu l ate ideas and processes in 
both prescribed and new ways. In our 
rapidly expand ing information socie-
ty, abstract knowledge has become a 
commodity traded through educational 
systems which provide avenues for 
upward mobility. Intellectual 
capital provides access to incomes 
and the ability to exercise one's 
potential in a social ,y condoned 
manner. 
As our stepped educational 
system aptly attests, membership in 
the New Class entails a lengthy 
process of learning highly socialized 
and specia l i zed codes for processing 
informati on . For many occupations, 
graduate study is the culminating 
educational experience for induction 
into the New Class. Graduate creden-
tials are an i nd i cation of a refined 
understanding of the knowl edge base 
and procedu res of a given area of 
study. The major contradiction of 
the New Class is that whi l e it wi shes 
t o extend Its membership -- inasmuch 
as its social value is related to the 
size and prestige of i ts membership 
- - at the sa~e t ime its cap ital value 
is dependent on maintaining exc lu-
sionary practices (Gouldner, 1979). 
Capital had meaning, significance, 
and power only to the ext ent i t is 
desired and 1S accessib l e through 
procedures that el iminate some 
aspirants . If essentially anyone 
coul d easily gain access to a New 
Class occupation, its capita l would 
be devalued, It is here in that 
se l ected and exclu sionary types of 
real i ty emerge that acquire - -and 
actually requ i re-- a commitmen t 
resulting In reificat i on. Reifica-
tion occurs when the historicity, 
human authorship, and relativity of 
an Idea, val ue, or behavior becomes 
obscured (Apple, 1979; Sowers, 1984), 
The New Class is composed of 
various knowledge bases and operating 
procedures for a variety of occupa-
t ions and discip l ines, Hi story and 
ongoing developments provide eich 
diSCipline with a variety of sc~oo ls 
of thought from whi ch to choose their 
intellectua l b~ses . In other words, 
there are within the New Cl~ss types 
of knowl edge and procedures more or 
less spec i fic to each occupational 
area, ~nd , withi n each area, suc~ ~ s 
art educati on, the r e is ~ f urther 
different iation of selected knowl edge 
bases. 
The rather generalized child-so-
cie ty-subject tri~d of Ral ph Tyl er 
(L949 ) has been used to cescr i be the 
focus of programs and even eras i n 
art education (Hamblen, 1985). 
Efl and's (L979) different i at ion of 
aesthetic and psycholog ical schools 
of thought i nto mimetic - behaviorist, 
pragmat ic-cognitive, express lve -p~y­
choanalytic, and objectivist-gesta l t 
has been appl led to curricular foci. 
Oeslgnations such a$ these provide 
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convenient l abels for descri bing 
varied and wide - rang ing phenomena. 
Most graduate program~, however, have 
a much mOre differentiated ana 
esoteric knowled;e base that eludes 
such categor i za t ions. The nature of 
this knowledge base and the difficu l-
t ies encountered in unde rstand i ng i t 
make it des irable and give i t power . 
Also, i t 15 t he knowledge base's 
relative inaccessi bility that m~kes 
the soci alization processes of New 
Class l ea rning especially potent and 
long-lasting. A gradua te program 
knowledge b~ se canno t be learned 
half-heartedly. In the hect ic pace 
and i ntense focus of graduate study, 
students must learn a r ange of 
fo undational information as wel l as 
quickly figure out wh i ch r esearch 
topics and ~ethods of inquiry are 
preferred with in their graduate 
program. HistOrical orlgin~ and 
re lativ i ty of knowledge ~nd proce-
dures are not continually probed. 
While t aking a stat istics c l ass and 
working with maximum variance in 
factor an~ l ysis it is doubtful many 
graduates have l earned t ha t t his 
procedure "arose histor i cal ly wi th 
reference t o a defi ni te t heor.Y of 
intelligence (Thurstone's bel ief in 
i nde~endent pr i mary mental ab ili ties) 
and in oPPo5it i on to another (gener~ l 
intelligence and hierarchy of l esser 
factors ) buttressed by principal 
COl!1ponen ts ~ (Gould, 1981, p . 301 ) . ! 
am proposing that 9raduate programs 
~elect base~ of knowledge t hat ar e in 
favor, that these are exclusionar y , 
and t hat t hey become reifications due 
to t he powerful reinf orcements 
invo l ved . 
In is a 
se l ective distr i bution of knowl edge. 
Although indivi dual progra..,s change 
over t i me with personnel changes. 
they also exhibit a recognizabl e 
character based on the types of 
acade~lc r eal i ty which are 9iven 
credence. This is what we, as 
graduate students, readily recognize 
in candidates from other universit ies 
and often s aw as being a matter of 
wrong thinking. 
Particular types of inquiry can 
be seen in dissertations from partic-
ular universities. One might be 
fairly accurate in predicting that 
many Pennsylvania State University 
dissertations would have a phenomeno-
logica l focus during the 1970's . 
During this time, the Uni vers i ty of 
Oregon was represented by a number of 
dissertations with a sociocultural 
framework placed on art instructiona~ 
phenomena. The University of Il1i-
no;s has had a fair number of disser-
tations based on the empirical 
investigation of the psychology of 
responses to art; Stanford graduates 
have often written on the use of 
educational criticism as a mode of 
analysis. Even greater differentia-
tion of pattern ing can be ascertained 
by looki ng at the dissertati ons 
produced under the guidance of 
particu l ar mentors at these universi-
ti es. 
That types of i nquiry and 
ultimate ly meaning are a matter of 
social conditioning and are relative 
to one's purpose is highly ev ident in 
who is quoted and by whom within 
research circles. Broudy (19B5) has 
noted that, even when a number of 
scholars are dealing with a fair ly 
narrow topic, their references will 
differ. For example, he found that 
among fou r scholars who compiled a 
reference list of fifty to ninety 
sources on a given topic only five 
sources were repeated and those 
sources were works by the four 
scholars. 
There is no one particular body 
of knowl edge required of an area of 
study. As our hapless candidate 
often found out, reference to a 
researcher not currently in favor was 
a breach of etiquette tantamount to 
making unseemly noises at the dinner 
table. In some art education pro-
grams, Lowenfe ld's ideas stil l shape 
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the focus and modes of inquiry. In 
others, mention of his name in 
anything other than a critical tone 
or because of historical necessity 
will cause one to lose points. The 
bad blood generated between Lowenfeld 
and Schaefer-Simmern in the 1950's is 
still a controversial issue on some 
campuses, generally falling along the 
lines of professors who had them as 
their advisors or who were, in tu rn , 
schooled by professors who worked 
under them. In some art educat ion 
departments , Carl Jung is best 
considered two four-lettered words. 
In others, one must believe that art 
provides avenues to the ineffab l e and 
that art can unite all of humanity in 
a common vision --or one risks being 
l abe lled a positivist. Examp l es of 
who is in, who is out, who is a 
nobody, what sources are current, 
which ones are passe , how particu lar 
sources are to be interpreted , which 
research modes are preferred, and so 
on, could, with some research, be 
cited for each art education program 
in the United States. 
One can reasonably argue that 
program differences are necessary for 
the vitality of any field; they 
provide graduate study choices, and 
they result i n research being pro-
duced from a variety of perspect ives. 
These benefits are not being di sput-
ed. Rather, I am proposing that due 
to the highly selective information 
and procedures in each program and 
due to the attractive rewards to be 
gained and the punishments to be 
avoided from adhering to the tenets 
of a specific program, a program's 
knowledge base is often not seen as 
relative to human selecti on and 
authorship. It becomes seen as t he 
correct way to understand the fie l d 
of art education . 
Educat;on as a 
Means of 
Soc;a l ;zat;on 
In this discussion, socializa-
tion;s being used interchangeably 
with educat ion . Sociology of knowl-
edge theorists suggest that knowledge 
and modes of inquiry do not exist as 
ent iti es separate from human selec-
tion, interpretation, and signifi-
cance (Berger & Luckman, 1966; 
Bowers, 1984). To participate in any 
educational process is to participate 
in learning what has been given some 
type of social group vali dation . It 
may mean learning to discuss the 
ref i nement of aesthetic sensibilities 
as the main reason for art criticism 
instruction and to consider only 
artistic exemplars as valid objects 
of study. Conversely, one may learn 
to consider art criticism as pr imar i -
ly an analytic tool and to believe 
that all artistic forms are worthy of 
study. In graduate study these and 
myr i ad other distinctions are learned 
in lectures, discussions, the writing 
of research papers, and so on. They 
become the substance of frames of 
thinking that will be app li ed to 
current and, more than likely, future 
problem-so lvi ng. 80th knowl edge 
bases and modes of inquiry become a 
part of what Bowers (1984) has called 
the deep structure of our thinking 
and which Apple (1979) has metaphori-
cally located at the bottom of our 
brains to indicate its imbeddedness. 
This is not to suggest that 
doctoral candidates are passive 
creatures, soaking up whatever is 
env i ronmentally offered like some 
Skinnerian sponge. They do question 
and give their own interp retations, 
often vehemently disagreeing with 
thei r university professors, and 
after graduation may produce research 
very different from what was current 
in their graduate program. Some 
graduate students , however , con-
sci ously select a university based on 
the types of rea l ity sets i n which 
t hey wish to be educated and the 
professional network they wish to 
develop. To some extent, through 
this choice, they participate in 
constructing the knowledge base and 
modes of inquiry that tend to become 
reified as they proceed through the 
graduate socialization process. They 
are, in effect , fairly willing and 
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eager to become expertly sociali zed 
within some selected shape of academ-
ic reality. Even among those who 
wish to question the process, there 
are powe rful incentives t o conform 
and procedures operating to mini mize 
di ssent. As one progresses through 
the educat iona l system , 
"one becomes increasingly reti-
cent to tamper with that system 
in any signif i cant way ... . As one 
becomes more central t o the 
system les s deviation is accept-
able because i t has a more 
pr ofound impact on the system as 
a whole .... The institution does 
not select ... those who wi 11 
potenti ally do i t harm by ma ki ng 
sweeping changes . The strongest 
institutions accept dissenters 
into per i phe r al positions, giving 
these dissenters a chance t o 
accept parts of the system , thus 
developing a stake in that 
system. Dissent is thereby dealt 
with through a co-opting rather 
than confrontational technique . 
(Anderson , 1985 , p.22- 23). 
Re;nforcements 
in Graduate Study 
Among the growing research of 
folk lor ists are co ll ected stor i es on 
the anxieties and peri ls of writing a 
dissertation in which instances of 
lost, misplaced, stolen, and des -
troyed dis sertat ions have been 
re 1 ated (L i pson-Wa 1 ker, 1983). <1> To 
this body of research could be added 
accounts of changed disse rtation 
top i cs to fit committee members' 
wi shes, how dissertation committees 
are se l ected, and so on . Within the 
oral tr adition of art ed ucation, 
there is the perhaps apocryphal 
account of the professor who would 
l ock his office door, turn out the 
li ghts, and then hi de out on the fire 
escape to elude a persistent doctor al 
student. And, there are the comi c-
tragic accounts of students having to 
schedule commit tee meetings in the 
mornings because by the afte r noon a 
professor's liquid lunch wo ul d have 
tak.en effect. 
Psychologists, polit ical poll-
sters, and business managers might do 
we ll to study how graduates se l ect 
their doctoral committees as one of 
the most sophisticated, finel y t uned 
decision-making examples in today ' s 
society. This is a high - stakes 
decision wherein types of academi c 
r eality of di fferent professors 
en countered during gr aduate work must 
be delicately ba l anced and reflected 
in one's own work or, at the very 
least, not criticized. Graduate 
students have been pampered and given 
every type of assistance; they have 
also been terrorized by personality 
conflicts, innumerab le dissertat ion 
rewrites, and ambiguous expectations. 
In a variety of f ields, the re 
have been publicized accounts of 
students who have fail ed to f ini sh 
their programs because t heir contro-
versial resear ch would cause their 
university to lose the support of 
powerful foundat ions or lose exchange 
s tudents from a potentially offended 
foreign government. At some univer-
s ities, individual doctoral disserta-
tions must fit within a larger 
r esearch project. Failure t o work 
with the project can mean inte rmi na-
ble delays i n fin ishing the program. 
One ; s reminded of the jaded defini-
tion of a successful student as be i ng 
one who knows how t o adjust his/her 
thinking to conform to the require-




That professors educate within a 
particular academic reality set is to 
be expected . Profess ors are in the 
business of professing. They are 
often hired for their strong, dis-
tinctive, and we ll -deve l oped research 
i n a fa irly narrow area of study. As 
a signifi cant other , t hey are formi-
dable. They have an elaborated 
speech code that is not eas i 1 y 
assai 1 ed. But aga in, graduate 
s t udents do not enter programs to 
become skeptics regarding the i r home 
un iversity program. Graduate stu-
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dents are poised to be li eve, and on ly 
with difficulty may come to admit 
that a formerly admired mentor has 
been f ound to have fe et of c l ay, 
Graduate students are expected 
t o develop a fin ely tuned sense of 
s kepticism regarding the work of art 
educators e l sewhere , but if such 
cr it ici sm is openly directed toward 
their own program, they may find 
themse lves without any mentors, let 
alone a f ri end ly doctoral commi ttee. 
Not only must graduate studen t s avoid 
criticizing the specif ic work of 
their own profess ors , they a l so must 
be careful that their ideas are not 
too divergent from their professors~ 
genera l frames of reference. For 
example, Lowenfeld was not known fo r 
produci ng a generation of art educa-
tion graduates who were either 
critical of his work or of his views 
on a vari ety of subj ects. This does 
not suggest they were passive, 
unthinking individuals, but, rather, 
that in se l ect ing to study under him , 
they were predisposed to some extent 
to his vi ewpoint. 
Doctoral students , more than 
many others in soci ety, have been 
rewarded throughout much of the ir 
formal education for thoroughly 
l earni ng information presented to 
them. They have often become very 
proficient i n the bus iness of being a 
student. As they have focus ed on a 
particular program of graduate study, 
their t ypes of academi c rea l ity 
became more fine ly tun ed and discrim-
inatory. These types of reality take 
on a correctness which is questioned 
at the peril of lower grades, lack of 
support for a graduate assistantsh i p, 
numerous dissertation proposal 
rewrites, a lingering dissertation, 
and , to some extent, a loss of 
persona l stabi lity . As in most 
socializing situations, it i s infi -
nitely easier to be l i eve and conform 
that i t is to diss ent. Du plicity 
wi t hin a doctoral program is not 
easi l y maintained . 
Doctorates are not necessar ily 
given to the most creative peo-
ple, but more often to those who 
have l earned to conduct t hem-
selves in such a way as to 
successfully make it through all 
the requ i red rites of passage. A 
certain kind of acceptance of the 
status QUo is required of those 
who would advance through the 
educational system either 
acceptance or phenomenal cunning 
and patience. (Anderson, 1985, 
p. 24) 
Ostensibly, un iversities are in 
the business of educating for criti-
cal th i nking and for encompassing 
multip l e viewpoints . Yet, one can 
read of professors who are not 
granted tenure for their political 
views or, perhaps, for their less 
than Puritan life-styles. The 
seriousness of thinking or doing the 
wrong stuff is evident in the fairly 
common and lingering idea-feuds 
between professors who have different 
viewpoints. Orwell's (949) and 
Koestler's (1941) chilling accounts 
of mind control indicate that a 
fearful onus can be placed on making 
ideological errors in thought as well 
as in deed. In our information 
society, it is not just a matter of 
outward l y acting correctly. One's 
ideas- - and the values and assumptions 
integral to those ideas- -must also be 
properl y aligned. 
As Gouldner (1979) has dis -
cussed, ideas are a commodity; they 
are a form of capital . Capital as 
hard cash can be used to buy real 
estate; capital as ideas can be used 
to i nfl uence mean i ngs, va 1 ues, and 
actions that have few geographic 
restraints. Star doctoral candidates 
produce research that furthers their 
mentor ' s ideas much as favored 
children physically and emotionally 
resemble their parents . Starting 
with graduate school, a network of 
contacts and of mentors ;s bui l t that 
can have important implications for 
future employment, editorships, 
consultancies, and so on (Hamb l en, 
1986). A community of l ike-minded 
thinking is bui l t up around ideas, 
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forming a subculture of occupational-
ly related identifiab l e members. It 
is this professional subcul tura l 
component developing around ideas 
that provides the designations of 
insider and outs i der and all the 
parochial protectionism t hat comes 
with believing that one's group is 
correct. 
This is not to suggest that 
graduate faculty are intent on 
breaking the spirit of students or 
that students are isolated from 
divergent views. Quite the oppos i te 
is true, and this latitude, i n fact, 
tends to give the patina of correct-
ness to the reality set the student 
does fina l ly acquire. A specious 
freedom of expression i s imp li ed in 
academia (Shaw, 1985) . At any 
university there is a wealth of 
library resources, professor s in 
other subjects areas wi th differ ent 
views, and contacts with educators on 
national, state, and local levels. 
The academic is portrayed as being 
actively involved in weighing a l ter-
natives, engaging in debate, refining 
positions, and Questioning premises. 
The appearance of choice is every-
where. Moreover, most pro f essors 
want students to develop into inde-
pendent, critical thinkers who are 
able to base their arguments on a 
wealth of ideas. Yet, such cr i t i ca l 
thinking occurs wi thin assumpt ions of 
shared definitions of what i s and 
what is not correct . Selected 
assumpt ions offer approaches for 
look i ng at a range of phenomena 
which, throughout one's graduate 
program, are used as part of one's 
argumentation, are made pub li c , and 
are subject to revi ew. Students 
practice defending and refining their 
developing reality set and devising 
lines of thought to repudiate and 
deflate cr i t i c i sm of the i r vi ews. A 
l engthy series of forma l and i nforma l 
reinforcements and implied and real 
threats operate to sociali ze the 
graduate student into part i cular 
modes of think i ng. 
MODES OF 
INVESTIGATION 
Within the university environ-
ment, dedicated to the presentat ion 
of mu lti ple viewpoints, one would 
think that processes of investigation 
wou ld mitigate against the rei fica-
tion of knowledge and modes of 
i nqui ry . Such ; s not the case. 
Bowers (1984) suggests that modes of 
inquiry such as positivism and 
rational i sm obscure the i r human 
authorship and tend to provide their 
own justification. "Positivism lends 
i ts own form of legitimization to the 
idea that knowledge is socially 
neutra 1 . Cha l1eng i n9 POS'1 t i vi sm. 
particularly within the university 
setting, ;s a l onely formidable 
challenge indeed" (Bowers, 1984, p . 
69). According to Bowers, rationally 
fai l s to "grasp the nature of real ity 
and to take control of it from the 
mystifying forces of history ... reason 
itself is shaped by the unconscious 
history embedded in the language 
through which we der ive the cogniti ve 
maps that serve as the basis of the 
rational process" (p. 69). 
Hermeneutics , phenomeno l ogy, and 
exis tentialism have often been 
offered as antidotes to ahistoricism 
and asocia l positions. They are 
considered approaches that can make 
explicit the relati vity of exper i enc -
es and meanings throughout time and 
space. Th i s paper's examination of 
types of academic reality in graduate 
study falls into this general catego-
ry of reflexive inquiry. However , 
such an approach should not lull us 
into believing that some greater 
truth is thereby being revealed . The 
fa ll acy of self-reflexive modes of 
inquiry is that they also cannot 
escape their hi storicity and a 
selected framework of assumptions. 
Reflexive approaches are a lso subject 
to reification and exc lusionary 
attitudes toward other modes of 
inquiry. An examinat ion of one ' s own 
premises is a twentieth century 
phenomenon that i s evident in a 
vari ety of New Class disciplines and 
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is very much part of mode rnity 
(Foucault, 1970 ; Gouldner, 1979: 
Hamblen, 1983). 
It is not the purpose of this 
paper to proffer a solution to what 
could easi ly develop into a regres-
sion of prob l ematizing stances, i.e., 
an examination of one's examination 
ad infinitum. It is, however, being 
proposed that graduate programs with 
reflexive modes of inquiry are no 
more immune to a reificat;on and 
parochialism of their methodology 
than positivism, rationali sm, or 
whatever. Ironically, a methodology 
that incorpo rates a probl ematizing, 
reflexive stance can give a sense of 
cor r ectness specifically because a 
stable truth is not being claimed. 
NEW C LA SS VA L UES 
IN AR T EDUCAT I ON 
Part of the r eason for the 
reification of varying types of 
academic real ity that may even 
encompass problematizing modes of 
inquiry is that art education shares 
in the altruistic values of the New 
Class. Members of the New Class 
believe that they are the guardians 
and promulgators of knowledge t hat i s 
necessary f.or individual and societa l 
well - being (Gouldner, 1979). The ir 
motives and actions are embedded in 
the democrat ic and humanistic princi -
ples of equa lity, honesty, and 
caring. The rhetoric of art educa-
tion literature would have one 
bel ieve "that there is not a mean 
bone in art education's collective 
body" (Hamb len, 1986, p.102). It is 
easy to assume a correctness of 
knowledge and mode of inqu i ry when 
one ' s ideas and actions are focused 
toward aesthetic enlightenment , 
social understanding, individual 
awareness , improving the quality of 
l ife , and so on. 
New Class intellectuals are not 
merely content to act. They are also 
act ively involved in examining the i r 
own acts. There is the implication 
that such self - ref l exion will e limi -
nate bias. When involved in what is 
soc; all y defi ned as a worthy ·cause. 
it is easy to forget that one is 
making se lections from a range of 
possibilities and that one ' s own 
shape of consciousness ;s also part 
of the examining consciousness . One 
only need be in a class where a 
self-reflexive model of inquiry is 
mandatory to see that there can a l so 
be a dictatorship of compulsory 
openness and benevolence. The 
failure to examine types of reality 
in art education as a function of 
relative socialization processes is, 
in part, a function of sharing in the 
New Class belief that methodologies 
based on good intentions equate with 
right thinking . 
SUMMARY 
Most research in art education 
has been applied to education at the 
el ementary and secondary levels, with 
1 ittle interest focused on the 
assumptions and li fe world circum-
stances of those who carry out such 
research and who formulate policy. 
Attention needs to be directed to the 
socialization processes to which art 
educators are subject and the impli -
cations of those processes. 
This paper has dealt with an 
examination of how graduate students 
in art education learn types of 
academic reality based on the select-
ed knowledge bases and modes of 
i nquiry particular to their universi -
ty's program. These knowledg e bases 
and modes of inquiry take on a 
reified correctness and lose their 
historicity and human authorship due 
t o the rigorous socialization process 
and the reward system of graduate 
education. New Class members' belief 
that they are engaged in improving 
the conditions of society and are 
acting without self- interest also 
obscures the selection process and 
relativity of individual knowledge 
bases . 
In this paper, no so l ution ;s 
offered to eliminate the parochial ism 
and excl usionary attitudes that 
develop around types of reality in 
art education. A social theory of 
knowledge distribution has been 
deemed applicable in this instance to 
examine the circumstances of art 
education graduate study. This 
author agrees with Donmoyer's (1984) 
belief that research approaches need 
to be evaluated. not on an apriori 
set of criteria, but on the basis of 
the purposes and meanings relative to 
one's intent. In other words, 
thinking the right stuff can be 
most ly a matter of deciding what one 
wishes to accomplish. 
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Footnotes 
1 I wish to thank Dr. Kristen Congdon for bringing this source to my 
attention. 
Ch icago: 
2 After a particularly grueling series of statistic assignments, my education 
professor jokingly remarked that individuals with doctorates are in high 
demand, not because of what they know, but because they do whatever the task 
demands. 
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